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In the oontroversy ooncerning animal 
research, perhaps the following argunents 
represent the extreme positions: 
The pro-animal argument: 
AI: Animals cannot freely and with 
understanding give or withhold oonsent to 
participate in experiments. 
A2: Experiments l1\3.y be performed only 
on those who freely and with understanding 
oonsent to participate in them. 
A3: Therefore, experiments may not be 
performed on animals. 
The pro-researcher argument: 
Rl: Human life is a higher form of life 
than animal life. 
R2: Experiments should be performed to 
preserve and enhance the quality of life of 
the higher life forms, even when this in-
volves sacrificing the lives or quality of 
life of lesser life forms. 
R3: Therefore, experiments on animals to 
preserve or enhance the quality of human life 
should be performed. 
Each of these arguments forms a tight little 
syllogism of which even Aristotle oould be 
proud. But are the premises reliable? That's 
where the issue lies in this dispute. We 
shall question each in tUITl. 
AI: Animals cannot freely and with under-
standing give or withhold consent to parti-
cipate in experiments. 
This \IIOuld probably be considered the 
least oontroversial of the four claims I1\3.de 
in these argunents. Nonetheless, it is not 
cbvi0us that animals lack the intellectual 
ability to give or withhold consent to parti-
cipate in experiments. Certainly, in many 
cases, they clearly indicate their willing-
ness or reluctance to participate to anyone 
willing to notice. 
Consider the case of Professor Barnes, 
who wishes to determine whether nnnkeys can 
canbine various things in their environment 
to form a useful tool. He puts sane bananas 
inside a cage but far enough away fran the 
bars so that the rocmkeys outside cannot reach 
them. He then puts several short sticks 
which can be fitted together to form one long 
stick outside the cage and watches to see 
whether the rocmkeys, after realizing that 
they cannot reach the bananas either with 
just their arms or with just one stick, will 
put the sticks together to form a stick long 
enough to reach the bananas. The IOOnkeys 
native to the region have long since becane 
accustaned to the research station, wander 
into the cernpound each lOOrning in search of 
food and entertainment, and, this lOOming, 
are soon engaged in trying to get the banana., 
so alluringly out of reach inside the big 
cage. 
Consider also the case of Professor 
Jacobs, who is engaged in a series of 
sleep deprivation experiments involving cats. 
These experiments require that electrodes be 
placed into the cats' brains, that the cats 
be placed in a restraining apparatus, and 
that they be hooked up to a roonitoring device 
which delivers painful shocks to them when-
ever they start to fall asleep. When Prof. 
Jaoobs canes to the colony to get one of the 
cats for an experiment, the cats all o:::Mer 
and crawl into the far corners of their 
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cages. When the professor opens one of the 
cages, that cat hisses and strikes out at 
him, which is why Prof. Jacobs has taken to 
wearing long, protective gloves when handling 
these cats. Q1 the way to the laboratory, 
the cats continually attempt to escape. 
Do the I1xmkeys who try to get Professor 
Barnes' bananas consent to participate in 
that experiment? Do the cats who try to 
escape fran Professor Jacobs withhold con-
sent? 
It is clear in the second case that the 
cats, by their behavior, indicate that they 
desire not to participate in the sleep depri-
vation experiments. Given the chance, they 
would "vote with their feet" and leave the 
good professor behind. But can this contrary 
behavior be sensibly interpreted as the cats 
withholding their consent to participate in 
the experiments? Based on the standard re-
quirements for informed consent when dealing 
with human research subjects, we may be in-
clined to say "no." Since cats cannot under-
stand the experiments in which they are to 
participate, they cannot formulate informed 
judgments to participate or not to partici-
pate in the research. 
lbwever, that conclusion would overlook 
the fact that understanding is not sanething 
that exists by itself; it is always saneone's 
understanding. So, when we say that the cats 
do not understand the experiments, what we 
mean is that they do not understand them iT. 
the way Professor Jacobs does. But while 
that is doubtless true, it does not follow 
that the cats do not understand the experi-
ments at all or that they do not understand 
them in the way required to give or withhold 
consent. 
It is clear that Professor Jacobs' cats 
must understand the experiments in sane way; 
otherwise, they would not be hissing and 
attempting to escape. Furtherrrore, even 
anong humans, to be capable of g~V1l1g or 
withholding consent does not require that one 
understand the experiment in the way the 
researcher does. All that is required is 
that one be sane and understand how the ex-
periment will (likely) affect him/her. cats 
seeking to escape fran the torments of sleep 
deprivation research would seem to be expres-
sing a sane, reasonable understanding of how 
the experiments will affect them. Indeed, if 
the cats did not behave in this way in this 
circumstance, we would be inclinffi to say 
that "they don't know what's going to happen 
to them" or that they had entered a 
state of psychotic depression. Conse-
quently, it makes sense to say that Prof. 
Jacobs' cats, through their contrary beha-
vior, are withholding consent to participate 
in his research. 
What about Professor Barnes' rronkeys? 
They are free to roam in and out of the 
ccmpound, and we may also preSlIDle that they 
have not been starved nor are otherwise des-
perate for food. So, they have not been c0-
erced into participating in the experiment. 
Furtherrrore, the rronkeys understand what the 
situation holds for them, namely, bananas, if 
they can figure out how to get them, disap-
pointment, if they cannot. Prof. Barnes has 
a rrore expansive understanding of the situa-
tion, including the contribution the experi-
ment could make to "science" and his 
career, but these extra dimensions of the 
situation do not affect the rronkeys' capacity 
to act as sane, reasonably self-interested 
agents in consenting to participate or not to 
participate in the experiment. As long as 
the rronkeys are aware of what is happening to 
them during the experiment and as long as 
they are free to withdraw fran the experiment 
whenever they do not like what is happening 
to them, it would be reasonable to say that 
their participation in the experiment is an 
expression of consent to participate. This 
interpretation is analogous to Soorates' oft-
repeated claim that merely by living in a 
free society we agree to the social contract. 
Animals signing consent forms may be a 
joke, but animals giving or withholding con-
sent to participate in an experiment is not 
absurd. Q1 the contrary, it is carm:m, easi-
ly reoognized, and often well-i.nformed and 
reasonable, fran the animals' point of view, 
which, where consent is the issue, is the 
Viewpoint that counts. It follows that A1 is 
false. The problem with applying the consent 
requirement to animal research is not that 
the animals are incapable of giving or with-
holding consent. The problem is merely that 
researchers do not want to be frustrated by 
animals refusing to participate in their 
experiments. 
A2: Experiments may be performed only on 
those who freely and with understanding 
consent to participate in them. 
Although still deeply resented by many 
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researchers, the requirerrent that people be 
adequately infmne:i and freely a:rnsent before 
becaning research subjects has becane a stan-
dard part of the ethics governing research 
with human subjects. '!bere are bo.u reasons 
for this requirement. 
(be is the many horrible experiments 
that "scientists" have inflicted on defence-
less or unwitting research subjects. Not 
only Nazi experiments but also experiments 
perfonned in this country an prisoners, the 
retarded or mentally ill, racial minorities, 
and the poor have outraged the PJblic and 
shown the need to protect people against 
callous, unscrupulous, and overzealous 
researchers. 
'!be other reason for the oonsent re-
quiremellt is our belief that individuals 
should, as far as possible, be free to direct 
their lives acoording to their own values. 
People' s lives should not be oontrolled by 
others who think "they know best," since what 
looks the best to them may not be the best 
for saneone who has different values. For 
example, to a physician camti.tted to preser-
ving life at all costs, remaining alive on a 
dialysis machine may "obviously" be the best 
thing for saneone suffering fran kidney fai-
lure. But the persan actually having to live 
such a life may not find it of sufficient 
quality to be worth the trouble. The old-
fashioned "doctor knows best" paternalism 
would have left the decision to the doctor. 
Our new respect for self-determination has 
fostered the requirement of consent to coun-
ter-balance paternalism and to insure that we 
all have the opportunity to pursue our lives 
according to our own values (provided we 
acoord others the same freedan). 
Hopefully, the informed consent re-
quirerrent is working to reduce the number of 
research abuses of human subjects. However, 
it does not prevent doing research with human 
subjects who have not consented to partici-
pate in the research. If a person has a 
legal guardian, that guardian may consent for 
his/her ward to participate. 'Ibis can happen 
when a person is judged to have lost oontact 
with reality, as in mental illness, to be 
tmable to make a decision, as when one is in 
a cana, to be tmable to weigh the lcng-range 
benefits, as with children, or when the indi-
vidual does not yet have his/her own values, 
as with infants. In such cases, "paterna-
lism" is not a dirty word. As lcng as the 
guardian does what he/she believes his/her 
ward would want or what would be in the 
ward •s best interest, such cu'!pz"anises of the 
principle of self-determination are not only 
morally acceptable but necessary to provide 
the individual the help needed to attain or 
return to the condition where he/she can take 
control of his/her own life. 
It follows that A2 is not an accurate 
statement of current research ethics oon-
cerning human subjects. Non-consenting indi-
viduals may be research subjects, if they are 
tmable to recognize and evaluate the benefits 
(for them) to be attained fran the research 
and if they have a guardian who decides that 
participating in the research will be in 
their best interest (or will, at least, cause 
them no hann). 
Just as this exemption opens the door 
for therapeutic research an humans without 
their oonsent, so it would leave open the 
door for therapeutic research on animals. 
'Ibis is the way things ought to be. Recall 
that the reason for insisting on infonned 
oonsent is to protect individuals against 
abuse. It would be an abuse of that ooncern 
to make of the oonsent requirerrent an un-
bending principle which prevents those in-
capable of assessing the possible lang-range 
benefits (for themselves) of a procedure fran 
benefitting fran research. It follows that 
A2 would not (other things being equal) be a 
desirable moral reform of our current re-
search codes , either. 
While our oonclusion must be that 
neither of the premises of the pro-animal 
argument is oorrect and, oonsequently, that 
the argument is unsound, we may note that 
honoring the reasons why Al and A2 are incor-
rect would p..1t an end to virtually all ani-
mal research. Animals who rebel against 
research are virtually never resisting scme-
thing that is for their own long-term bene-
fit. Usually, what they fear and seek to 
escape is all the experiment and the future 
hold for them, namely, illIprisorooont, pain, 
torment, and death. No sane, ccrnprehending 
individual would agree to participate in most 
animal research, and no responsible guardian 
would agree to allow his/her ward to partici-
pate in that research. So, acknowledging 
that animals can give or withhold a:rnsent to 
participate in an experiment and. that their 
withholding a:rnsent can be overridden for 
their own good would perm.it only animal re-
search which is pleasant for, innocuous to, 
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or beneficial for the animals themselves. 
Rl: Human life is a higher foun of life 
than animal life. 
No foun of life is intrinsically higher 
or lower than any other--that is a logical 
truism. Sanething can be higher or rrore 
valuable or rrore wortl.y or superior to sane-
thing else cnly when measured against some 
starrlard. What is the starrlard here, and 
what should it be? 
'!he usual standard is intellectual abi -
lity. For whatever Freudian reasons, the 
ability to employ reason to control one's 
life and surrot.mdings has traditionally been 
=nsidered the rrark of human superiority. 
IOOeed, it has even been called the image of 
God, the Creator and controller of the uni-
verse, in humans. 
But while it seems true enough that 
humans are, ordinarily, rrore intellectual 
than other animals, it is not at all clear 
that this is a rrorally significant dif-
ference. Especially when we view this issue 
in tenns of the analogy to God the Creator, 
it seems to follow that what we are talking 
about is our ability to daninate and control. 
Citing that ability as our rrorally crucial 
superiority to other animals suggests that 
the pro-researcher argumant rests on the 
claim that those who are strong enough to 
exploit others are for that very reason jus-
tified in doing so.If that~what is being 
argued, the pro-researcher argt1IreIlt is an 
instance of the "might makes right" fbilo-
SOPly--hardly a IlX)rally canpelling p:Jsition. 
'!here is another, lI'Ore credible inter-
pretation of the lI'Oral relevance of intellec-
tual superiority: a rroral agent is sUpp:Jsed 
to be one who acts out of respect for imper-
sonal laws, and it requires reason to recog-
nize such laws, counter-balance selfish 
feelings, and do the rrorally right thing. 
However, while this Kantian view of the rroral 
significance of reason is superior to the 
previous, Machiavellian account, it is clear-
ly exaggerated. Kant's claim that acting out 
of a sense of duty is the only rroral rrotive 
is mistaken. Loving parents are rrorally 
estimable; indeed, they are rrorally rrore 
estimable than "dutiful parents," a Iilrase 
which usually damns with faint praise. An 
adequate IlX)ral theory ITUlSt (at least) make 
roan for rroral sentiments alongside rroral 
reasoning. 
But once we open this door for sentiment 
to enter the rroral arena, it is not at all 
obvious that instinctual and conditioned 
actions which are intentional and sincere 
resp:Jnses to the needs of others should not 
count as rroral actions and those who do them 
as rroral agents. For example, are we to say 
that a rrother bird who feigns a broken wing 
and risks her life to distract a fox fran her 
nest is not worthy of rroral acclaim because 
she acts on maternal instinct, rather than by 
judging her maxim to be one she could will as 
a tmiversal law? What about a human rrother 
who instinctively rushes into a burning house 
to save her baby; ITUlSt she subscribe to the 
categorical imperative in order to merit 
rroral acclaim? Of course not. Whether bird 
or human, being a devoted rrother is a rroral 
virtue, and this is an evaluation based on 
the IlX)ther's self-sacrificing aommitment to 
her child, rather than on her capacity for 
abstract reasoning. 
'!hus, we cannot so blithely dismiss 
loyal dogs, courageous lions, self-sacri-
ficing p:rrents of a wide variety of species, 
rronogarrous wolves, resourceful beavers, and 
the like as not being rroral agents because 
they are "merely creatures of instinct." 
Seeing virtue in other animals is not anthro-
p:rrorphizing, unless we preS1.llre that they do 
their virtuous deeds as a result of the same 
intellectual process we have to employ when 
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our social instincts fail us and we have to 
canbat our lesser, selfish selves. However, 
just as there is no reason to suppose other 
animals go through this process, so there is 
no rroral need for making such a presumption. 
What makes an action an expression of rroral 
agency is not that the agent had to put 
his/her internal house in order in order to 
overcome temptation and do what is right. 
For an action to be an expression of rroral 
agency, all that is required is that it be 
done intentionally and sincerely in response 
to what the agent perceives to be the need of 
another. The actions of rrany animals appear 
to be such expressions. 
'Ihe belief that we are rroral agents and 
other animals are not is likely just an ex-
pression of our awn species prejudice, and 
rationalistic rooral pulosopues are merely 
attempts to rationalize that prejudice. If 
we are \TOrally superior to other animals, it 
JID..lSt be a question of degree, and given our 
particularly bloody, destructive, exploita-
tive habits and history, that question must, 
at best, be considered open. Given our 
species prejudice, we may even question whe-
ther we are capable of sufficient impartiali-
ty to attempt an unbiased answer to. that 
question. 
'Ihe other traditional standard of rroral 
superiority of relevance here is the ability 
to feel various pleasures and pains. It has 
been claimed. that humans are capable of 
feeling pleasures and pains of a greater 
variety and subtlety than other animals, and 
that since the fundamental goal of rrorality 
is to maximize the excess of pleasure over 
pain in the world, we are justified in sacri-
ficing less sensitive beings in order to 
benefit the rrore sensitive. 
Of course, we might respond that we 
could equally well increase the excess of 
pleasure over pain by sacrificing those 
beings who are rrore sensitive to pain in 
order to benefit the less sensitive, but we 
will not be so impertinent. Instead, we will 
simply ask if it is so clear that humans are 
\TOre sensitive to pleasure and pain than 
other animals. Can we enjoy the life of a 
dog, a bird, a bat, or a porpoise~ can we 
appreciate the subtleties of smell, sight, 
sound, and touch which these animals can 
apparently appreciate? Perhaps they cannot 
appreciate Michelangelo and l-bzart (an insen-
sitivity, let us not forget, not limited to 
members of other species), but that these are 
regarded as superior pleasures by (sane of) 
us does not show that they are superior to 
the pleasures of other animals. 
John Stuart Mill, the great champion of 
qualitative differences arrong pleasures and 
pains, acknowledges that the only way to 
determine which are the superior pleasures is 
to find scrneone who can appreciate the lot 
and ask him/her which ones he/she prefers. 
That is impossible here; for even Jclm Stuart 
cannot know the pleasures of the gull and the 
dolphin. Consequently, as befits such a 
determinedly egalitarian and evidenced rroral 
pulosoj:i:ly, utilitarianism must reject this 
effete basis for saying that one sentient 
life form is superior to another. 
other utilitarians of a rrore Benthamite 
stripe, such as Peter Singer, claim that 
hurnans are capable of a greater arrount of 
pleasure and pain than other animals because 
we are capable of projecting the future and 
remembering the past to a vastly greater 
degree than other animals. '!his ability 
makes it possible for us to experience the 
pleasures and pains of such feelings as hope 
and regret, feelings those of lesser temporal 
capacity cannot experience•• However, even if 
this is true, it may also be true that the 
present pleasures and pains of other animals 
are roore intense than ours because they are 
not diluted by thoughts of the past or 
future. If that is the case, the extra in-
tensity of their pleasures and pains might 
rrore than outweigh the extra pleasures and 
pains our extensive temporal capacity pro-
vides us. Of course, once again, there is no 
way of telling whether the pleasures and 
pains of other animals are rrore intense than 
our awn and, if so, whether that greater 
intensity is sufficient to outweigh the 
greater extent of our pleasures and pains. 
Thus, this Benthamite version of human su-
periority encounters the same sort of problem 
as the Millian version and must suffer the 
same fate. 
'!here could, of course, be an eOOless 
line of suggestions for the standard which 
shows that humans are superior to other forms 
of life, but we shall stop with these two. 
'Illey are the rrorally relevant standards, and 
with these two the issue is open and must 
remain open, since there appears to be no 
non-arbitrary way of telling which species is 
the roost rroral or sensitive. It follows that 
when interpreted in a \TOrally relevant way, 
Rl cannot be justified. 
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R2: Experiments should be performed to 
preserve and enhance the quality of life of 
the higher life fonns, even when this in-
volves sacrificing the lives or quality of 
life of lesser life fonns. 
For the purposes of argument, let us 
preSl.llre to be true what we just determined 
there is not good reason to believe, i.e., 
that humans are IOOrally superior beings. If 
what makes us a IOOrally superior life form is 
our ability to set aside self-interest and 
rrake an impartial, disinterested appraisal of 
what ought to be done, then it is a cruel 
irony to cite this as justification for our 
disregarding the interests of inferior ani -
mals and exploiting them as mere means to our 
own ends. Our (supposedly) greater ability 
to act impartially does not provide ~ basis 
for our acting selfishly in ~ dealings with 
those of (supposedly) lesser IOOral ability. 
Indeed, to the extent that we exploit those 
less fortunate than our- selves, we 
bring into disrep.1te our claim to IOOral 
superiority. Doing experiments on other 
animals which we would not be willing to 
do on ourselves is a clear example of such 
discrediting exploitation. Consequently, 
Kantianism does not support R2. 
The utilitarian concern in research, as 
elsewhere, is to maximize benefit and mini-
mize suffering and to do so without preju-
dice, i.e., without favoring the interests of 
one group over those of another group in 
balancing the pleasures against the pains. 
Consequently, the principle of utility does 
not reccmnend that we structure our experi-
ments so that "lower" orders are sacrificed 
for the benefit of "higher" orders. Rather, 
it <nmJaIlds us to structure experiments in a 
way which will involve the greatest benefit 
and the least suffering altogether. 
This imperative poses a serious IOOral 
obstacle to current animal research 
procedures, since they involve sacrificing 
tens of millions of healthy animals. This 
sacrifice involves adding greatly to the 
annunt of suffering in the world and, final-
ly, when these animals are killed, eliminates 
the possibility of tens of millions of happy 
lives fran the positive side of the utili-
tarian ledger. Intuitively, the precept 
which would best meet the utilitarian concern 
is that research should be restricted to: 
(i) experiments which do not cause 
suffering, 
(ii) experiments conducted on those who 
already suffer frem the malady in question, 
(iii) experiments which are cxxnpensated 
with a reward of happiness for the research 
subjects which IOOre than outweighs the sacri-
fice involved in the experiment, and 
(iv) experiments which require iIrlivi-
dual sacrifices as the only kncMn way for 
attaining clear and present, significant 
group benefits. 
Restricting research in these ways would hold 
out the prospect of alleviating suffering in 
ways which do not create additional misery or 
loss, unless they are necessary for and out-
weighed by sane clear and present good. This 
is what utilitarians, and, I should think, 
all IOOral people, IlU.lst prefer. 
Thus, if we approach the issue frem 
either a Kantian or a utilitarial1 perspec-
tive, designing experiments to sacrifice 
supposedly lower life fonns in order to bene-
fit supposedly higher life forms, i.e., our-
selves, is IOOrally disrep.1table. Experi-
ments IlU.lSt be justified on the grounds that 
they are fair to all concerned and that they 
are likely to make the world a happier place, 
and these justifications provide no grounds 
for our securing our own happiness by des-
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at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral con-
an end in itself, although when Kant, alas,
cerns, justice and happiness. Consequently, 
approved anneither premise of the pro-researcher argu- ethic forbidding utilization of a 
sentient creature as an object rather than asment is morally justified. 
declared that ''man can have no duty to any 
beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both 
Conclusion Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly 
that at that point they would have parted 
<Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso-
prohibit all research with animals, is un- ];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that 
proposition "revolting and abaninable." 
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would 
sound, but so is the pro-researcher argument, 
which would pennit any experiment on animals 
which might benefit humms. The reasons 
against these arguments suggest the following 
positive conclusions: 
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